Financial Sector Reform in Central and Eastern Europe: Approaches and Progress by Wihlborg, Clas
 
 
 
 
LEFIC WORKING PAPER 2004-03 
 
 
Financial Sector Reform in Central and Eastern Europe: Approaches and 
Progress 
 
Clas Wihlborg 
 
www.cbs.dk/LEFIC 
 
  
      
  
 Copenhagen Business School 
 Solbjerg Plads 3 
 DK-2000 Frederiksberg 
 
 
  
 
 1
Financial Sector Reform in Central and Eastern Europe: Approaches and Progress 
 
Clas Wihlborg, CBS 
 
1. Introduction 
Reform of the financial sector is probably the most controversial aspect of the transition from a 
centrally planned to a market economy. One reason is that allowing banks to allocate credit based 
on market principles implies almost inevitably that an important instrument for supporting 
politically favored projects is removed. Another reason is that the financial sector often is viewed as 
a symbol of market capitalism in that power over economic resources shift from the government to 
private individuals. Thus, it should come as no surprise that efforts to reform the financial sector 
along the principles of a market economy have met more resistance than other transition reforms 
such as price liberalization, privatization of industries, labor market reform, attempts to achieve 
macroeconomic stability.  
          In a market economy where ownership of the means of production is private, the financial 
sector carries out essential functions formerly handled by the central planning agency. Financial 
resources are allocated to investors and consumers through the credit allocation process in banks 
and/or in markets for stocks and bonds. If the financial sector does not perform its functions 
effectively many of the objectives of the reform process may not be met. This point will be 
discussed in more detail below. 
           In this chapter the progress of financial sector reform in Central and Eastern Europe will be 
discussed, and the relative progress of different countries will be compared in the light of different 
approaches to reform and historical factors influencing these approaches. The role of financial 
sector reform or lack thereof in the general economic development of different countries will also 
be addressed. 
 The immediate problems facing financial reformers in the transition were two-fold. On the 
one hand, the commercial banking system was laden with “bad loans” of state-owned enterprises 
that showed little promise of becoming profitable as independent enterprises. On the other hand, the 
same banks were expected to allocate new credit to profitable firms that would be able to repay in 
order not to generate more bad loans. Therefore, bank managers’ incentives and objectives had to 
be re-oriented. Furthermore, the banks had to be able to provide liquidity and participate in a 
functioning payment system. 
 Another issue facing reformers in the early transition was whether they would encourage a 
regulatory and legal structure of the Anglo-Saxon type dominated by decentralized capital markets, 
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or a regulatory and legal structure dominated by large banks as in Continental Europe. The Anglo-
Saxon financial system puts more restrictions on the activities of commercial banks, and it generally 
provides for stronger protection of the common investor in securities markets. 
 The financial system and its functioning depends not only on the regulation and law for 
financial institutions and markets but also more generally on the legal and political infrastructures. 
For example, dispute settlement in courts needs to be predictable and enforceable in order for firms 
and individuals to enter and rely on contracts. The political decision-making process can become 
intertwined with decision-making in financial institutions, when, for example, there are close 
personal and financial relations between politicians and bankers. The politicians have the power to 
grant favors to bankers, and bankers have the power to provide politicians with financial favors. 
Lending to “related parties” is a source of bad loans in many countries where politicians are able to 
support the bankers’ schemes to hide or be compensated for non-performing loans. 
 Effective banking supervision can prevent various forms of corrupt practices, as well as 
contribute to effective credit allocation procedures in banks. Thus, the building up of effective 
supervisory agencies is one of the tasks of the reformers during transition. 
 In Section 2, the functions of the financial system in market economies, and its potential 
contribution to economic growth and welfare are reviewed. Thereafter in Section 3 the legacy of the 
central planning and the problems facing financial sector reformers in the early transition are 
discussed. Approaches to the main problems caused by the legacy of central planning are discussed 
in Section 4. Specific country cases illustrate progress and failure. In Section 5 a leap to the present 
day is taken. The current state of financial development and progress in developing a legal and 
regulatory infrastructure are described. Approaches to reform, and historical and political factors 
that may explain the differences in financial sector development are discussed in Section 6.  
 
2. Functions of the financial system 
 In a market economy the financial system is expected to perform a number of important 
functions influencing the efficiency of the economy as a whole. Most textbooks would distinguish 
among the following three functions: 
1) Organize the payment system 
2) Enable consumption smoothing for households facing a variable income stream 
3) Enable trading in and sharing of risk of firms and projects in order to allocate financial 
resources in accordance with wealth-holders’ risk-return preferences. 
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According to traditional welfare oriented models which assume zero costs of transactions and 
information, households are able to maximize their wealth if the financial system is efficient in 
terms of functions 2) and 3) in particular. 
 The above three functions can be performed in decentralized markets for securities or within 
intermediary organizations like banks. In decentralized markets, risky securities are priced in 
trading to reflect information about risk and expected returns. Alternatively, households deposit 
their savings in financial institutions, and managers in these institutions determine the 
allocation. Among financial institutions banks are special, because they accept very short-term 
deposits available on demand. Thereby they become an important part of the payment system. 
 An economic model without transactions and information costs cannot be used to evaluate 
alternative institutional arrangements. Once such costs are recognized, the financial system has 
additional and conceptually more complex functions. Furthermore, institutional arrangements 
become important. Rybczynski (1992) emphasizes that the financial system must reallocate 
accumulated old savings already invested in projects and firms according to wealth owners’ 
prefences for risk and return. This function implies that transactions and information costs, and 
dynamic aspects of the financial system must be recognized. As new information appears 
accumulated capital should be reallocated at the lowest possible cost. This reallocation of old 
savings requires that some activities are terminated while others are initiated, and financial 
resources must be withdrawn from the control of some managers of projects in order to be made 
available for more productive managers. Managers are in control of financial resources under 
specific contractual arrangements as specified, for example, in company law. Thus the 
reallocation function depends on a set of legal and contractual arrangements between managers 
and wealth-holders. We enter here into the area of corporate governance. 
 Taking dynamic aspects into account, two more functions of the financial system should be 
added to the three listed above (payment system, consumption smoothing, and risk-sharing): 
4. Provide liquidity of claims and securities 
5. Provide a system of corporate governance influencing managerial incentives, and 
mechanisms for changing management. 
                 Liquidity can be created through the banking system by the acceptance of short term 
deposits coupled with longer term lending, or in securities markets by the trading of equity, bonds 
and bills. Liquidity of securities cannot be obtained without substantial volume of trading. A high 
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volume of trade requires heterogeneity of information and/or risk preferences at any time. Since risk 
preferences are nearly constant over time, it is the heterogeneity of information, causing speculative 
activity based on differences in expectations, which must be relied upon. Lacking liquid securities 
markets, commercial banks act as intermediaries, issuing highly liquid assets for depositors, while 
managing the depositors’ funds in such a way that depositors’ preferences for return, risk, and 
liquidity are satisfied. 
 Corporate governance issues have increasingly come to economists’ attention during 
recent years. Financial economists in particular study this issue, because most financial 
contracts more or less explicitly include rights to control or influence management under 
some conditions. Equity in firms carry obvious control rights as specified by a vote or a 
fraction of a vote in shareholder meetings. 
 Banks and corporate bond-holders lending money to a firm are usually able to obtain 
direct control rights under specific conditions when the firm does not deliver cash flows as 
contracted. Lending contracts often include specific rights of monitoring or conditions with 
respect to the financial performance of the borrower. The latter solution is common when 
there is direct lending, i.e. when a firm issues securities to the public. Monitoring rights, on 
the other hand, are associated with indirect lending from households to banks, and from banks 
to firms.  
 Clearly, institutions matter for both liquidity and the effectiveness of corporate 
governance structures. In a bank-oriented system, banks’ monitoring of managers on behalf of 
relatively uninformed wealth-holders plays a major role. In financial systems dominated by 
directed lending through securities markets, information about management must either be 
publicly available or gathered and analyzed by individual buyers of securities. 
 In order to analyze the effectiveness of financial systems with respect to corporate 
governance, it is common to start from the premise that managers and wealth-holders are 
asymmetrically informed about both the available projects and managers’ characteristics and 
actions. 
 The financial system must solve two problems.1 First, as a result of asymmetric 
information about managers’ and projects’ characteristics, wealth-holders and lenders in 
general face the so-called adverse selection problem. This problem arises, for example, when 
prospective borrowers of different quality face the same loan price. The relatively low quality 
borrowers have stronger incentives to borrow than the high-quality borrowers.Therefore 
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lenders must act to avoid being saddled with bad loans. Credit rationing is one instrument 
available to bank managers.2 
 The second problem arising from asymmetric information is the moral hazard problem, 
also called the “hidden action”, or “principal agent”, problem. This occurs when managers’ 
objectives may differ from shareholders’ and lenders’ objectives with the possible 
consequence that the manager’s unobservable actions may serve his own interests rather than 
those of the shareholders and other lenders. 
 The term “agency costs” is often used to describe the efficiency costs caused by both 
the adverse selection and the moral hazard problems. An efficient financial system with 
respect to corporate governance would minimize the sum of agency costs and costs of 
reducing agency problems. Varying institutional set-ups differ with respect to these costs. For 
example, the Anglo-Saxon financial system dominated by securities markets relies on the 
threat of hostile take-overs to align the incentives of managers and shareholders. If this threat 
is weak, managers become “entrenched” and agency costs rise. The European and the 
Japanese financial systems are more bank-oriented. They rely on bank-monitoring and 
relatively few dominant shareholders to influence managerial incentives and to fire inefficient 
managers. It is not obvious, however, that the banks and the dominating shareholders always 
serve the interests of the many smaller shareholders. 
 There are necessarily conflicts and trade-offs among the five functions of the financial 
system described here. For example, optimal risk-sharing and consumption-smoothing in 
securities markets requires that all relevant information about projects and securities is 
quickly reflected in prices. However, if prices quickly incorporate information from various 
sources, then the threat of hostile take-overs is reduced and management entrenchment 
becomes pervasive to the possible detriment of shareholders.3 
 Another trade-off may exist between payment system efficiency and efficiency of 
corporate governance. It is often argued that without government protection of depositors the 
payment system is subject to the risk of bank-runs that could be contagious. Government 
protection of the banking system reduces the incentives of bankers to devote resources to 
credit evaluation and monitoring, and the protection induces excessive risk-taking in limited 
liability banks. 
 In the debate about Eastern European banking reform it is often said that banks fail to 
impose a “hard budget constraint” on the borrowers. This term can be interpreted as a 
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condition for effective corporate governance. Without a hard budget constraint, firms’ 
managers have the incentive to cover losses with new borrowing even if the firm’s net worth 
is zero or negative. The banks’ incentives to impose hard budget constraints on firms by 
means of monitoring and contract enforcement are weakened by protection of depositors, and 
further weakened by protection of shareholders. 
 
3. The legacies of central planning and the task of reformers 
The banking system of the socialist economies in Eastern Europe performed only the payment 
function among the five functions described in the previous section. Financial resources were 
allocated by central planning authorities and the financial institutions did not have a role in 
the selection of managers. Well into the 1980’s, the banking systems consisted of a “mono-
bank” performing the roles of central bank and, in a limited sense, commercial banks. In 
addition, specialized banks were set up for long-term financing of investments but the credit 
allocation of these banks was also determined by central authorities. The allocational role of 
prices, wages, and interest rates was obviously limited in the planning system. 
 During the late 1980’s reforms of the central planning system began. Prices and wages 
were liberated during the course of a few years, although price controls remain in some forms 
in many countries. Prices and wages were given a much larger allocational role, however. 
 The banking systems in Eastern Europe were restructured during the late 1980’s. Two-
tier banking systems were created by separation of the central banks from the commercial 
banks. In most countries, the commercial bank function was split into a number of formally 
independent but still state-owned banks. Table 1 from Thorne (1993) shows the dates for the 
creation of the two-tier systems in Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia (CSFR), Bulgaria, and 
Romania. The table sets out the starting conditions for the financial systems in these countries 
in 1989. 
 The number of commercial banks created out of the mono bank, the small number of 
privately owned banks at the time of the break-up, the number of specialized banks, and the 
number of savings banks are shown in the table, The numbers are relevant for gauging the 
degree of competition that can be expected in the liberalized economy and for the 
privatisation process. A large number also implies that the “too big to fail” argument applies 
less strongly if the legacy of bad loans creates a crises for one or two more banks. It is 
noteworthy that Bulgaria in particular divided its mono-bank into 59 new units. Poland 
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divided its mono-bank into nine banks while the other countries kept the concentration high 
with four or fewer “new” commercial banks. 
 Table 1 also shows the relative importance of different types of financial institutions at 
the time of the break-up. Specialized banks were particularly important in Poland, where the 
assets of the commercial banks represented only 8.5 per cent of the total assets in the banking 
system. At the opposite extreme, 67.8 percent of the total assets were held by commercial 
banks in CSFR. Household deposits were almost exclusively held by savings bank in all the 
countries. 
 Banking reform started in Russia as early as 1987--ahead of the other Eastern and 
Central European economies. Three sectorally specialized commercial banks and a central 
bank were carved out of the Gosbank (Pohl and Claessens, 1994). Similar reforms took place 
in other republics of the former Soviet Union. In Estonia, for example, five sectorally 
specialized banks and a central bank were created. Until 1990, Estonia’s central bank co-
existed and shared responsibility with the Russian central bank. The Bank of Estonia was 
established in 1990 but it did not become a full-fledged central bank until the Estonian branch 
of Gosbank was taken over at the beginning of 1992. 
 After the creation of two-tier banking systems all the countries allowed a rapid increase 
in the number of new bank establishments. Few have reached a significant size, however. In 
Estonia, 12 new banks had started up by mid-1991 (Hanson, 1994) and the number reached 
around 40 in 1993. In Russia, 2,000 new banks denoted zero banks (as opposed to spin-off 
banks) were established. They were usually owned by one or more enterprises. In the other 
Eastern European economies the number of banks established by the end of 1991 were 19 in 
Hungary, 86 in Poland, 27 in the CSFR, 75 in Bulgaria, and 16 in Romania. In most of the 
countries, the banking system became dominated by a few large commercial banks existing in 
parallel with a large number of small banks usually associated with a group of enterprises. 
The exception was Russia, and to a lesser extent, Estonia, where hyperinflation reduced the 
real asset value of the large banks created from the mono-bank. The banking system in Russia 
became dominated by the many small banks.  
 8
Table 1: Banking Systems’ Starting Conditions (source: Thorne, 1993) 
 Hungary Poland CSFR Bulgaria Romania 
Date of political opening 1989 April 1989 November 
1989 
November 1989 December 
1989 
Date of break-up of the 
mono-bank and start of the 
two-tier banking system 
January 1987 January 1989 January 1990 January 1990 December 
1990 
Number of state-owned 
commercial banks 1/ 
4 9 2 59 4 
Number of private or foreign-
owned commercial banks 1/ 
2 5 0 0 2 
Number of specialized banks 
(excluding foreign exchange 
banks). 1/ 
10 1 1 8 2 
Number of banks specialized 
in foreign exchange 
transactions. 1/ 
1 3 2 1 1 
Number of Savings Banks. 1/ 1 1 2 1 1 
Date of last revisions of last 
legislation. 1/ 
January 1987 January 1989 January 1990 May 1990 April 1991 
Ratio of all specialized banks’ 
assets to total assets. 1,2/ 
47.7 79.1 32.2 54.0 52.3 
Ratio of commercial banks’ 
assets to total assets. 1,2/ 
35.0 8.5 67.8 25.5 18.2 
Ratio of total savings bank 
deposits to total deposits. !/ 
52.5 12.1 52.3 46.2 80.8 
 
1/ Estimated at the date of the break-up of the mono-bank. Because the central bank held a large portion of the 
banking systems’ total assets in Hungary, the sum of the ratios of commercial and specialized banks’ assets to 
total assets is low relative to the other countries.
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 The legacy of loans to SOEs (State Owned Enterprises) resulted in a build-up of bad loans, as 
SOEs were being kept afloat. The situation worsened over time in the new economic order, 
because many SOEs failed to become competitive while new credits were given to them. 
 Table 2 from Thorne (1993) shows the size of the non-performing loans at the end of 1990 
and mid-1991 in the five Eastern and Central European countries. The ratio of non-
performing loans to total loans loans in 1991 was around 50 per cent in all the five countries. 
The fiscal costs of removing these loans from the balance sheets in one stroke by the 
governments were 5-7 per cent of GDP in Hungary, Poland, and the CSFR. The 
corresponding figures for Bulgaria and Romania were 18 and 23 per cent of GDP. The bad 
loan problem in the republics of the former Soviet Union became less pronounced because 
hyperinflation effectively reduced the real value of old bank loans as well as intracompany 
debts. 
 The dependence of many SOEs and former SOEs on direct subsidies and unconditional 
credits was another legacy strongly linked to the bad loan problem of the banks. The inability 
of governments to cut off subsidies, and the money creation that followed both from fiscal 
deficits and from the flow of unconditional credits to the enterprises, led to high initial 
inflation. Table 2 shows that the annual inflation rates in the Eastern European countries 
ranged from 36 per cent in Hungary to over 500 per cent in Bulgaria in 1991. In Poland and 
the CSFR the rates were between 70 and 80 per cent. The near-hyperinflation in the ruble 
zone is well known. 
       In 1991, most of the countries discussed here embarked on programs to deal with the 
mounting costs of the legacy of bad loans combined with continued lossesdue to new bank-
loans. New banking laws were enacted in 1991 and 1992 in the Eastern European countries in 
preparation for the privatisation and restructuring of banks. With the exception of Hungary, 
the universal banking model of Germany was applied. In other respects, international 
standards for capital adequacy, and schemes for limited deposit insurance were implemented, 
at least on paper. Estonia is noteworthy because the currency board legislation for the Bank of 
Estonia implied that the ability of the central bank to contribute to the bailing-out of banks 
was limited. Two bank failures in 1994 led to losses for depositors. 
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Table 2: Macroeconomic Indicators, Non-performing Loans and Fiscal Costs in the 
Early Transition (source: Thorne, 1993) 
 
 Hungary Poland CSFR Bulgaria Romania 
Ratio of Enterprises’ Bank 
Credit to GDP (in percent) 
     
In end of 1990 25.8 15.6 60.5 78.8 38.6 
In June 1991 24 18.4 62.4 47.8 44.6 
Real Interest Rates      
In end of 19901 1.9 -44.4 -32.6 -35-5 -96.8 
In 3rd Quarter of 1991 8.1 15.6 2.3 -71.9 -31.7 
Annual Rate of Inflation (in 
percent) 
     
In end of 1990 33.4 250 16.6 64 150.1 
In June 1991 36 79.9 71.3 554.6 224.9 
Memo Items:      
Estimated Ratio of Non-
performing to Total Loans in 
1991 (in percent) 
50 40 55 44.2 36.6 
Estimated Fiscal Cost of 
Removing all Bank Non-
performing Loans (in percent 
of GDP) in June 19912 
5.4 6.5 5.6 17.7 22.9 
Source: Countries’ official statistics and author’s estimates. 
 
1 Because the end of 1990 CSFR’s real interest rate was not available, I have used the first quarter of 1992. 
2 It is the interest cost of either swapping government bonds for bank non-performing loans or of providing a 
government guarantee on these loans. Since there is no market government bonds in these countries, I have used 
the average nominal lending rate as a proxy. 
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 In 1992, with the legal and regulatory framework essentially in place, the Eastern 
European countries faced the following policy problems with respect to the banking sector: 
 
1) For the sake of the long-run efficiency of market economies, the banking system needed 
reform tto be able to contribute to effective corporate governance, imposing “hard budget 
constraints” on borrowers.  
 
2) In the short run, imposing hard budget constraints on borrowers would lead to widespread 
failures of many SOEs and, as a consequence, more unemployment. 
 
3) Without imposition of hard budget constraints on SOEs, attempts to reduce inflation by 
reducing monetary growth would lead to a credit crunch for aspiring new enterprises in the 
private sector. 
 
4) Since the net worth of many banks was negative or near zero, privatization of the banks or 
inducing banks in other ways to function as commercially oriented firms, would lead to 
“perverse” lending incentives.4 Thus, recapitalization was necessary. 
 
5) Cleaning the balance sheets of the banks through recapitalization would entail large fiscal 
costs. 
 
6) The cleaning of the balance sheets and the recapitalizing of banks with low or negative net 
worths could create expectations of similar bail-outs in the future. Such expectations would 
reduce the incentives of bank managers to impose hard budget constraints on firms and 
encourage excessive risk-taking. 
 
7) The legislative framework for dealing with distressed firms was incomplete or lacking 
leading to uncertainty about claims in case of liquidation of firms. 
 
8) The legislative framework for property rights, registration of, and trade in property was 
incomplete, leading to a lack of assets for entrepreneurs to offer as collateral against loans. 
       
        The policy conflicts were clearly challenging. There was a conflict between achieving 
long-run efficiency in corporate governance (1), and avoiding near-term costs (2 and 5) of 
restructuring enterprises and banks. There was a conflict between avoiding costs of perverse 
lending incentives (4) due to a back-log of bad loans and the incentive effects of bail-outs of 
banks (6). 
 
4. Approaches to early reform 
 
The immediate employment effects, as well as the expected fiscal costs (se Table 2) of rapid 
banking reform explain why most governments in the transition economies hesitated to 
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implement strong reforms. Even in the Czech Republic—as a part of the former CSFR--and in 
Poland, which led the way to market oriented reforms, the governments took only very 
tentative steps in the early 90s. Hungary was also unable to make quick progress. Bulgaria 
and Romania did not even approach the problems before 1995. The near-hyperinflation in the 
former Soviet Union actually simplified the reform problem in the former republics, but only 
Estonia took active measures to influence the incentives of bank managers at an early stage. 
 For the purpose of creating financial systems that could impose hard budget constraints 
on firms and banks wherein management would have incentives to allocate credit effectively, 
a number of approaches were available: 
 
1) Privatization without recapitalization of banks. 
2) Recapitalization with delayed privatisation. 
3) Simultaneous privatisation, restructuring, and recapitalization. 
4) A mixed strategy of commercialisation and partial recapitalization. 
5) An ad-hoc strategy (Hungary); privatization when opportunities arise, recapitalization when 
necessary. 
6) The creation of new banks. 
7) “Tie the hands” of government by the creation of policy rules. 
8) Encourage securities market development. 
 
1.Privatization without recapitalization 
Privatization of banks as well as of SOEs can be an effective way of introducing commercial 
incentives for management. It is, of course, necessary to cut off direct subsidies and 
expectations of subsidies protecting the wealth of the owners in order to achieve effective 
corporate governance. Privatization has the potential advantage of reducing the strength of 
bankers and businesses as political pressure groups. 
 As the Russian experience shows, the ability of privatization to rapidly change the incentives 
and the political strength of managers depends to a large extent on the method and speed of 
privatization. One reason is that expected privatisation creates uncertainty for managers about 
the future of their position of power. This uncertainty can create incentives for diversion of 
profits by incumbent managers and a lack of incentives for the same individuals to invest in skill 
development5. 
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 Another danger of privatization occurs, as already mentioned, if a firm’s or a bank’s net worth 
is zero or negative. Given limited liability, the owners of a bank with a small or a negative net 
worth have the incentive to continue lending to non-profitable enterprises in the hope of a turn-
around. Given the magnitude of the bad loan problem in Eastern Europe in the early 90s, the 
privatization of firms and banks with low or negative values seemed to be a dangerous process. 
 
2. Recapitalizing with delayed privatization 
The incentive effects of recapitalization alone have already been mentioned. The problem is one 
of time-consistency, in the sense that recapitalization of banks must not create expectations that 
there will be future bad loan bail-outs. Much delay in recapitalization has occurred because of 
fears that the one-time policy will not be credible. Without credibility recapitalization may 
slacken bankers’ incentives to impose hard budget constraints on firms in the future. 
 
3. Simulateous privatization, restructuring and recapitalization 
Banks operating under commercial principles must not have low or negative net worths and 
owners and management must not expect to be bailed out after making bad credit decisions. 
Thus there is a strong case for simultaneously privatizing and transferring resources to cover 
bad loans. The incentive effects of relieving the banks of bad loans can be counteracted by 
changing the “rules of the game”. Privitization can be thought of as a signal of such changes. 
Statements by governments that banks will not be bailed out in the future are certainly made 
more credible by the simultaneous restructuring of ownership. 
 The credibility of a no-bail-out policy can be enhanced in several ways. First, the reforms 
should occur as close as possible to the regime shift from central planning or to other reforms of 
the economic system. If after economic reforms there is delay before banks are recapitalized, a 
share of the bad loans have been created under the new regime and they are associated with 
behavior under this regime, The more far-reaching the economic reforms are at the time of 
recapitalization of the banks, the more credible are statements that the rules of the game are 
different. 
 A second policy to enhance the credibility of statement is to allow one or more particularly 
mismanaged banks to fail. Of course, if privatization has occurred, losses must be borne by 
management as well as owners and depositors if they are the only private suppliers of financing 
to the banks. Hanson (1994) argues that the credibility of the Estonian central bank was much 
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enhanced by its refusal to bear the costs of losses associated with the failure of three private 
banks in November, 1992. The flow of new bad loans has slowed thereafter, meaning that the 
budget constraint on enterprises has hardened. 
 A third credibility-enhancing policy is to divide the state-owned banks into several small units 
when privatizing them. The too-big-to-fail argument for bail-outs is otherwise always present. 
 While discussing Bulgaria’s failure to carry out early reforms, Thorne (1992) argued in favor 
of a policy of rapid privatization at an early stage in the transition process combined with 
simultaneous bank and enterprise restructuring. The restructuring would include the removal of 
bad loans both from banks and from SOEs that have built up large intercompany payables. 
 The restructuring of the banks in Thorne’s scheme includes dividing each commercial bank 
into one viable bank with a clean balance sheet and one institution with the problem loans. The 
first bank could be privatized quickly and be restricted to lending to the emerging private sector. 
The second bank would become an investment bank that could be privatised more slowly. Its 
task would be to get involved in the restructuring of former SOEs. The government would have 
to transfer funds to the investment banks over time when the bad loans from the enterprise 
sector appear.Thus, the fiscal costs would have to be realized. 
 Many industrialized countries have established separate institutions managing the bad loan 
portfolios that appear after bail-outs. In the USA, the Resolution Trust Corporation was created 
to manage the bad loan portfolio after the Savings and Loan crisis in the late 80s. In Sweden, 
several big commercial banks established separate units to recover as much as possible of bad 
loans. The most prominent one, Securum, was an off-shoot of the state-conrolled Nordbanken. 
 The schemes of removing the bad loans from the balance sheets of banks are often criticized 
on the grounds that they distort competition. Thus, relieving banks of the bad-loan problem 
should be combined with a change in management and an absence of rewards for the outgoing 
management team. 
 
4. A mixed strategy – commercialization and partial recapitalization 
The fiscal costs of removing bad loans and political difficulties associated with privatization 
hindered the quick reforms suggested above. The Czech Republic and Poland embarked on 
partial reforms including partial privatization and partial recapitalization in the first country and 
commercialization combined with partial recapitalization as a step before beginning a rather 
slow process of privatization of the nine state-owned commercial banks in Poland.6  
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 One controversial issue is whether the incentives for effective corporate governance structures 
can be created without rapid privatization. Poland in particular created boards and management 
teams for the state-owned commercial banks and according to, for example, Mulineux (1994), 
and Aghion, Blanchard, and Carlin (1994) there is strong evidence that the “commercialization” 
of state owned banks was successful in hardening the budget constraint on borrowers. 
 Aghion, Blanchard, and Carlin (1994) discuss the incentive effects for bank managers of 
commercialization versus rapid privatization. Their essential point is that, if privatization is 
expected at a later date, commercialization can be successful, because managers and board 
members have a chance to prove their effectiveness. Thereby they increase the likelihood that 
they will remain in charge after privatization. 
 If privatization is delayed but not sufficiently long for managers to prove their worth, 
commercialization is less likely to succeed because managers do not have the time to 
demonstrate their abilities. Great uncertainty about the method of privatization, and fears that 
managers will not remain in charge, can also lead to increased short-sightedness among 
managers. 
 The success of commercialization according to the above mentioned theory depends on 
expectations of privatizations at some future date, Without such expectations, 
commercialization is less likely to succeed because of the difficulty of the government as an 
owner to credibly commit to abstaining from political considerations when evaluating and 
selecting board members and managers. 
 The Polish privatization program was, as noted, slow. It was nevertheless credible because by 
the end of 1994, three of the nine large state-owned commercial banks had been privatized. A 
share of the bad loans had been lifted off the balance sheets against securities issued by the 
government under a bank reconstruction law. To relieve the fiscal burden of the reconstruction 
the privatised banks had to keep a share of non-performing loans. This policy may also have 
improved incentives to avoid adding to the stock of bad loans during the period before 
privatization. The Czech Republic was less successful in attempts to change the incentives of 
bank managers tthrough commercialization and privitization. We return to this issue in the next 
section. 
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5. An ad hoc strategy – the case of Hungary 
The privatization strategy of SOEs in Hungary was relatively piecemeal and ad hoc relative to 
the planned mass privatization in Poland and the voucher scheme in the Czech Republic. 
 The Hungarian approach to recapitalization of banks was to unconditionally cover loans 
classified as losses but not loans classified as doubtful or substandard. The lack of a clear 
privatization plan left the banks partially recapitalized but with little change in the incentives for 
managers to harden the budget constraint on firms. Further bail-outs were correctly expected 
according to Bugske and Vogel (1993). 
 The loans taken from the banks were transferred to an organization intended to become a state 
development bank. This organization was understaffed and had to ask banks to continue 
managing the bad loans. 
     There was an attempt in Hungary to force a hard budget constraint on firms by means of a 
very strict bankruptcy law. This law was implemented to substitute for the weak incentives of 
bankers. Firms were obliged to file for bankruptcy under strict conditions. The law failed, 
however, because the courts were unable to handle the enormous number of cases.7 
 
6. The creation of new banks 
Frydman et al (1992) argued that the “modus operandi” of commercial banks carved out from 
the old mono-bank was bound to be strongly influenced by the inefficient procedures and 
behavior patterns of the socialist system. They preferred that new banks be created to take over 
the operations of the old system. 
 Pohl and Claessens (1994) and Hanson (1994) argued that in Russia and Estonia, as well as in 
the other Baltic states, hyperinflation in the ruble zone shrank the old banks in the early 90s. 
Therefore, private banks came to dominate the banking system and these banks had no strong 
government safety nets. Privatization of SOEs was slow, however. Nevertheless, government 
subsidies became transparent when banks performed their corporate governance role more 
effectively. Thereby political pressures to reduce the subsidies increased. Estonia also had a 
credible privatization plan in effect at an early stage. 
 
7. “Tie the hands” of governments 
This approach is characterized by constitutional or other laws prohibiting certain actions by 
governments. In banking reform, a law that makes it politically impossible or difficult to bail 
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out banks with negative net worth forces bank managers to consider bankruptcy as a real 
consequence of bad lending decisions. As discussed above, privatization may have such an 
intent. 
 Estonia’s currency board arrangement for the central bank implemented in June 1992 implied 
severe restrictions on the government’s ability to bail out banks that suffered from large credit 
losses. First, currency board arrangements prevented the central bank from carrying out a 
“lender of last resort” role by providing a bank with liquidity, because under the rules of the 
currency board, the central bank must not conduct operations that affect the supply of base 
money8. In the crisis of two Estonian banks in 1994 there was no bail-out and even depositors 
lost money in the bank failures. Second, associated with the currency board arrangement in 
Estonia was a law that prohibited the government from printing money (borrowing from the 
central banks) to finance deficits. Thus, fiscal costs of bail-outs had to be financed through taxes 
or borrowing from the public. Thereby, the costs of bail-outs became transparent to the public. 
 In the Estonian case the currency board seems to have been an effective constraint on the 
government’s ability to bail out non-profitable banks. The task of imposing discipline on banks 
was simplified to a degree in Estonia relative to, for example, Poland, by the ruble inflation in 
previous years that shrank the old banks and their bad loan portfolios. Instead, new private 
banks were allowed to take over a large share of the banking system. Their political clout was 
possibly low. Thereby, the currency board arrangement became more easily acceptable 
politically. 
 
8. Developing securities markets 
As a substitute for bank credit, firms can obtain external financing by issuing equity, long-term 
corporate bonds, and short-term commercial paper directly to financial investors. The Anglo-
Saxon financial system is characterized by a larger role for securities markets than the 
continental European banking oriented financial systems. It could be argued that in the early 
transition, the development of securities markets could have substituted for a banking system 
that is constrained in its lending as a result of an overhang of non-performing loans. 
 A securities market oriented financial system requires that trading in markets becomes 
sufficiently large for securities to be liquid. Furthermore, it requires that information about firms 
be made available to potential investors at low cost. Investors demand transparency. La Porta et  
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Table 3: Financial Development Indicators
Inc/cap 
2001 
PPP-
rates
BCPS Ratio 
Bank credits 
Private 
Sector/GDP
Stock Mkt 
cap % of 
GDP*
Change 
BCPS ratio 
1998-2002 
(turning 
point) 
Asset 
Share of 
Foreign 
Controlled 
Banks
Index of 
Banking 
and 
interest 
rate lib**
Legal 
Transition 
Indicator 
(Com'l 
Law)**
1998 2001 1999 2001
Slovenia 17819 38.4 15.3 21.6 (1992) 5.6 8.5 41.7 48.4 18.4 2.59 3.53
Czech Rep. 15146 42.6 15.4 -15.0 27.0 13.7 23.1 3.8 84.0 2.79 3.40
Hungary 13030 29.3 18.7  9.2 (1997) 8.2 1.6 7.8 9.0 84.9 3.00 3.73
Slovak Rep. 11252 31.5 3.3 -20.1 9.5 22.0 50.7 4.9 88.6 2.50 3.06
Poland 9790 28.0 14.0 12.9 (1996) 4.7 9.2 24.9 24.4 49.6 2.76 3.20
Estonia 9555 46.0 27.0  35.3 (1994) 2.0 0.7 7.9 0 82.0 2.74 3.55
Croatia 8304 45.6 16.8 20.8 (1994) 15.5 7.4 39.8 5.0 84.0 2.33 3.35
Latvia 7547 29.8 9.2  17.9 (1997) 6.0 1.3 2.6 3.2 70.0 2.68 3.20
Lithuania 7521 12.3 10.0 2.5 5.0 7.0 41.9 12.2 - 2.29 3.46
Romania 6927 8.3 6.0 1.3 40.0 0.3 50.3 45.4 - 2.05 3.73
Bulgaria 5947 15.6 3.7 11.0 (1998) 6.4 3.2 50.5 19.9 74.0 2.14 3.73
Serbia Montenegro 5826 14.7 3.1  2.3 (2002)1 7.9 7.1 89.0 68.0 15.1 1.10 -
FYR Macedonia 4851 17.8 2.0 -9.1 44.0 16.9 1.3 1.3 44.0 2.24 3.46
Bosnia and H 3869 21.9 4.8  9.2 (2001) 1 15.0 6.3 75.9 8.9 66.3 1.48 1.93
Albania 3650 4.9 0 1.5 39.9 0.6 81.1 59.2 44.7 1.74 2.33
Euro Area 24428 95.3 >70
1) From turning point
* EBRD (2002) end 2001
** EBRD average 89-2002 Scale 1-4
***World Bank; Bank-Regulation and Supervision Database 2001 and 2003: 
The 1999 column refers to one of the years 1998-2000. The 2000 column refers to end of year
Asset Share 
of State 
Owned 
Banks
Non-
performing 
Loans/Total 
Assets***
 19
al (1998) argue that securities market legislation aimed at protecting small investors also 
supports the development of securities markets. 
 Even in the United States, securities markets do not substitute for bank credit across firms of 
all types and sizes. Small and medium-sized firms rely on bank loans. It seems that banks 
complement securities markets for many firms in the sense that bank loans are viewed as a 
signal of creditworthiness by investors in securities markets. Nevertheless, encouragement of 
securities markets can reduce the pressure on the banking system to provide credit for large 
firms in particular.  
 The Czech mode of privatization of SOE in the early transition can be viewed as an attempt to 
create liquid equity markets for large firms. While most countries aimed to privatize in such a 
way that controlling owners with a large stake in the firms would exist, the Czech Republic used 
a system of vouchers for each household. Each voucher could be used to bid for equity in firms 
at auctions. Ownership thereby became extremely decentralized. The voucher system could 
have laid the foundation for a liquid equity market while the creation of value-enhancing larger 
controlling stakes could have occurred over time. However, the Czech strategy for securities 
market development did not succeed well, as we will see in the next section. One reason is that 
households owning vouchers had little information about the value of auctioned firms, and they 
owned too little to make information gathering worthwhile9. Thus, the foundations for an 
effective pricing process did not exist. Most individuals sold their vouchers to a few funds that 
came to dominate equity ownership. A share of the funds was linked to banks that remained 
state owned. 
      Section summary 
Alternative approaches to the problems of an overhang of non-performing loans to SOE’s and of 
the formation of incentives to allocate financial resources in an efficient way have been 
reviewed. Most transition countries faced the prospects of substantial lay-offs in SOE’s if credit 
contracts were to be enforced, if fiscal costs of recapitalizing banks were large, and if there was 
risk that recapitalization would undermine incentives of bank managers to allocate and manage 
credit efficiently. 
 Successful reform depends on a combination of political will and ability, credibility in reform 
efforts regarding recapitalization and privatization, and a willingness to bear fiscal costs. The 
advantages of a credible privatization plan, the simultaneous recapitalization of banks and the 
changing of the rules of the game for banks have been emphasized. Experience shows that the 
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lack of credible statements about bail-outs being one-time events can be very damaging. 
Similarly, the lack of a credible privatization plan created incentives among bank managers to 
keep on supporting loss-making enterprises and possibly to divert resources to themselves. 
 The Estonian experience shows that the currency board system forcing monetary discipline 
contributed to the enforcement of hard budget constraints on banks and firms. Estonia and the 
other Baltic countries faced a less severe bad loan overhang as a result of high inflation in the 
ruble zone in the late 1980s. The CSFR conducted privatization with the purpose of encouraging 
the development of decentralized securities markets to substitute for bank lending to large 
enterprises. This effort was as a whole not successful; however, Hungary attempted to create 
conditions for a hard budget constraint on borrowers through Draconian bankruptcy laws. This 
effort had to be abandoned within a couple of years. 
 
5.  Financial development after a decade 
What has been achieved during the 90s? In this section a leap in time is taken in time in order 
to judge the successes and failures of the various approaches to financial sector reform. 
 A number of indicators of financial sector development are presented in Table 3. Data are 
presented for Central and Eastern Europe, including the Baltics in the north and the Balkan 
countries in the south. The countries are ordered by national income/capita in 2001 in order to 
get a picture of any obvious relation between income/capita and financial development. The 
second column shows an indicator of financial intermediation through the banks, i.e. bank 
credits to the private sector relative to GDP (BCPS). It can be seen that all the countries remain 
far below the average for the Euro area. Although the ranking of the countries by BCPS is not 
obviously the same as the ranking by GDP/capita, the BCPS ratio for the relatively wealthy 
countries is substantially higher than the ratio for the relatively poor countries.  
 In the previous section it was noted that borrowing through securities markets may substitute 
for banks’ credits, if liquid informative markets exist. The third column shows that the stock 
market capitalization as a percent of GDP in each country is quite low relative to the Euro area. 
Furthermore, the countries with relatively high BCPS are also the countries with relatively high 
stock market capitalization. Thus, securities markets do not seem to substitute for development 
of a well-functioning banking system. This observation supports Rybczynski’s (1988) view that 
financial systems generally develop through a banking-oriented phase towards a phase when 
securities markets become more important. 
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 The initial conditions in terms of wealth and financial intermediation were closely correlated, 
as Table 2 shows. It is therefore more meaningful to evaluate the accomplishment of reforms by 
looking at changes in financial intermediation and other variables. The fourth column shows the 
change in credit to the private sector from 1998 through 2000. The year 1998 is chosen because 
1997 was a year when the BCPS ratios turned upwards in several countries after having fallen in 
the early years of transition. This early fall was caused by the drag of SOEs and the time it took 
to create conditions for banks to work on a commercial basis with incentives to enforce loan 
contracts. The turning point year for BCPS is shown in parenthesis. Those countries where no 
turning is noted have not yet experienced a sustained increase in the BCPS ratio. In other words, 
their banks are still not functioning as commercial banks are expected to in terms of supplying 
credit to the private sector..  
   The most rapid expansion in bank credit to the private sector has taken place in Estonia, 
Slovenia, Croatia and Latvia. Poland, Bulgaria and Hungary show modest increases. In 
Lithuania and Romania, bank credits to the private sector have changed very little since 1998. 
The Czech and Slovak Republics share negative figures along with Macedonia. 
   Countries with increasing BCPS ratios seem to have come to grips with the bad loan 
problems and successfully privatized or, at least, “commercialized” the banks. The column for 
non-performing loans shows that Estonia and Latvia are among the high BCPS growth countries 
to have very low shares of non-performing loans, while the share was falling in Croatia from a 
relatively high level. Bulgaria and Hungary, among the countries with modest growth of the 
BCPS ratio also had falling shares of non-performing loans. In Poland, as well as in Slovenia, 
the share was rising but from relatively low levels. The figures for the share of non-performing 
loans in the Czech and Slovak Republics indicate that these countries have not come to grips 
with the bad loan problem. Although the share was falling in the Czech Republic, it remained at 
a high level. In Romania, the share was 40% in 1999, indicating a very severe problem. The 
figure reported for 2001 is incredibly low (0.3 percent). It is disregarded here. 
 The countries with falling or constant BCPS ratios also seem to have been slow in privatizing 
the banks. In the Czech and the Slovak Republics and in Lithuania and Romania, the share of 
state-owned banks was still high in 1999 – in Romania, the share remained near 50 percent in 
2001. Among the countries with rising BCPS ratios, the share of state-owned banks was either 
low or falling sharply as in Croatia and Bulgaria. Slovenia seems to stand out as a country with 
rapidly growing credits to the private sector, a reasonably low (but rising) share of bad loans, 
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while nearly 50 percent of the banking system remains in state hands. This country seems to 
have been able to reform the incentive structure in banking while retaining a high share of state 
ownership. The rising share of non-performing loans is a source of worry for the future, 
however. 
 The column for the asset share of foreign controlled banks shows that foreign banks in 2001 
controlled more than 50 percent of the banking system in all countries except Slovenia, Serbia 
and Montenegro, FYR Macedonia and Albania. Thus, privitization has been accompanied by 
foreign direct investment in banking. Figures are missing for Lithuania and Romania. Much of 
the foreign bank expansion in the Czech and Slovak Republics, Croatia and Bulgaria took place 
between 1999 and 2001. The shift in ownership could be an indicator that the performance of 
the banks in the Czech and the Slovak Republics are about to improve, since foreign ownership 
of banks in Eastern Europe has been associated with a strengthening of the commercial 
orientation of bank activities. 
 The indexes for banking and interest rate liberalization and the legal transition indicator in the 
last two columns of Table 3 are similar across the countries with the exception of Bulgaria, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania. These data indicate that the formal regulatory and legal 
framework for a commercially oriented banking system has been put in place in most of the 
countries. The existence of formal law does not guarantee enforcement, however. This aspect of 
the legal system is dicussed below. 
 Table 4 presents data for restrictions on bank activities, concentration and supervision. A high 
figure for restrictions indicates that banks cannot supply a full range of financial services within 
a universal bank as in Germany. The figures show that most countries impose fewer restrictions 
than the USA, but stronger restrictions than Germany. 
 Bank concentration is very high in all countries that are covered by the data. The share of 
deposits of the five largest banks range between 57 and 90 percent. The potential drawback 
from such a high concentration is that competition in retail banking may suffer and that a bank 
in crisis may be considered “too big to fail”. The concentration is a result of a rapid 
consolidation of the many start up banks in the early 90s. The consolidation has been driven by, 
for example, minimum capital rules. 
Supervisory capacity has been built up in all countries for which the table has data. The 
number of supervisors per bank ranges between 0.8 and 2 except in Slovenia where the number 
is as low as 0.2. Slovenia is also the only country without explicit deposit insurances. These 
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figures could be an indication of substantial risk for depositors but the Slovenian banking 
system is largely controlled by the state as was shown above. State ownership often implies a 
degree of implicit deposit insurance. 
 
 
Characteristics of the legal systems in transition economies are shown in Table 5. Shareholder 
rights are included in order to discover whether stock market development is closely associated 
with the strength of such rights. Creditor rights are included in order to seek a relation between 
the strength of such rights and financial intermediation to the private sector. More general 
characteristics are also shown in the columns ‘Rule of Law’, and ‘Enforcement’. The latter is 
particularly interesting, since many countries may have laws on the books without enforcing 
them. 
Starting with the general legal system characteristics, the following countries score above 7.5 
for “Rule of Law”: Hungary  and Poland (8.7), Estonia (8.5), Slovenia (8.4), the Czech Republic 
(8.3), and Latvia (7.5). The scores for enforcement produce the following top 6 rankings: 
Table 4. Concentration and Supervision
Bank Activities 
and Ownership 
Restrictions 1-4, 
4= Restrictions
Percent of 
deposits in 
five largest 
banks
Professional 
Supervisors 
per bank
Legally 
Liable
Explicit 
dep. Ins.
Slovenia 2.3 64 0.2 No No
Czech Rep. 2.0 75 2.0 Yes Yes
Hungary 2.3 n.a. 1.0 No Yes
Slovak Rep.
Poland 2.5 57 2.4 No Yes
Estonia 2.0 95 2.5 Yes Yes
Croatia 1.8 57 0.8 Yes Yes
Latvia
Lithuania 2.3 90 0.8 No Yes
Romania 3.3 59 2.0 Yes Yes
Bulgaria
Serbia-Montenegro
FYR Macedonia
Bosnia and H
Albania
U.S. 3.0 21 0.1 No Yes
Germany 1.3 12 1.0 No Yes
Source: Barth, J, G. Caprio Jr. And R. Laine, "The Regulation and Supervision of Banks
Around the World: A New Database", Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services 2004
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Hungary (.76), Poland (.70), Slovenia (.65), Croatia (.04), Estonia (.61), and Bulgaria (.59) 
along with the Slovak Republic. There is no score for Latvia.  
 
 
Relating these observations to the discussion of financial sector development above it can be 
noted that all countries that either have achieved a high BCPS ratio, or have had rapid growth in 
this ratio, are among the countries ranked here. A second observation is that the two relatively 
developed economies that have not succeeded in reforming their banking systems have low 
Table 5: Legal Rights
Stock 
Mkt CAP
Rule of 
Law, 1-10
Enforce-
ment, 0-1
BCPS
ratio 1998
LLS
V
SMI
NT VOICE EXIT
LL 
SV
CRED 
CON
COL 
LAT
REM
EDY
Sum of 
rights, 
except 
LLSV
Slovenia 15.3 2.5 3 3.75 3 8.4 0.65 38.4 4 5 1 1.75 7.75
Czech Rep. 15.4 3 5 4.5 2.5 8.3 0.44 42.6 3 4 1 1 6
Hungary 18.7 3 5 6.75 0.5 8.7 0.76 29.3 3.75 3.75 3 1 7.75
Slovak Rep. 3.3 2.5 2 4 1 6.4 0.59 31.5 4 4 1 2 7
Poland 14.0 3 4 6.25 3 8.7 0.70 28.1 2.25 4.25 3 1.5 8.75
Estonia 27.0 3.75 4 9.5 2 8.5 0.61 46.0 4 4 3 1 8
Croatia 16.8 2.5 6 5.25 1 7.0 0.64 45.6 4 5 1 2 8
Latvia 9.2 3.5 1 7.25 1 7.5 n/a 24.8 4 5 1 1 7
Lithuania 10.0 3.75 1 9.75 1 7.2 0.39 12.5 3 3 3 0 6
Romania 6.0 3 1 5.75 1 5.6 0.52 8.3 4 4 1 2 7
Bulgaria 3.7 4 5 10.75 2 5.9 0.59 15.6 3 4 3 2 9
Serbia-Monten. 3.1 - - - - - - 14.7 - - - - -
FYR Macedonia 2.0 2.5 5 5.75 0.5 5.4 n/a 17.1 1 0 3 0 3
Bosnia and H 4.8 0.5 0 3.5 0 2.1 n/a 21.9 4 4 0 0.75 4.75
Albania 0 3 1 7.5 1 2.7 n/a 4.9 3 3 1 2 6
Rule of Law. Scale 1-10; 10 high: Regional expert rating in Central European Economic Review.
Legal Effectiveness. Range 1-4 i EBRD Survey of Legal Practitioners
Enforcement: EBRD Survey, "Proportion" confident that legal system will uphold contracts and property rights in business disp
LLSV: Range 1-10; From La Porta et al (1998)
SMINT: Range 0-6; Quality of Securities Market Regulation
VOICE: Range 0-16; LLSV plus aspect of minority shareholder rights
EXIT: Range 0-14; Rights of minority shareholder w.r.t. transfers of shares
LLSV: Range 0-4; From La Porta et al (1998)
CREDCON: Range 0-5; LLSV for creditor rights plus automatic tigger for bankruptcy and creditors' consent required in reorga
COLLAT: Range 0-3; Strength of Security Interest 
REMEDY: Range 0-3; Legal provision enhancing creditors' rights in bankruptcy 
Source:  Pistor, K., M. Raiser and S. Gelfer (2000) "Law and Finance in Transition Economies". EBRD Working Paper No. 48
Shareholder rights Creditor Rights
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scores in one of the two dimensions. The Czech Republic scores low (.44) on enforcement while 
the Slovak Republic scores relatively low on Rule of Law. 
It seems that there is a clear relation between the effectiveness of financial intermediation to 
the private sector and the above characteristics of the legal system. A causal relationship is less 
obvious, however.  
Turning next to creditor rights the data is harder to interpret. There are many aspects of credit 
market and bankruptcy law and they are difficult to weigh together. LLSV is the score created 
by La Porta et al (1998) based on the sum of four aspects of the law.10 CREDCON includes a 
few more aspects of creditor rights (see table notes). This score, COLLAT and REMEDY cover 
different dimensions and can be added. The sum, being the most comprehensive measure of 
creditor rights, is shown in the last column.  
The highest scorers in the sum column are Bulgaria (9), Poland (8.75), Croatia (8), Estonia 
(8), Slovenia (7.75) and Hungary (7.75). Bulgaria’s high score may seem surprising but it 
should be noted that the scores refer to the letter of the law. In Bulgaria’s case, strict creditor 
rights are not matched by equally strict enforcement. The group of countries scoring relatively 
high is the same group scoring relatively well in general characteristics of the legal system and 
showing evidence of positive development of bank credit to the private sector. 
Turning to the development of stock markets and scores for shareholder rights, Table 5 
includes four different measures of these rights.11 The measures are not independent and they 
are not obviously closely correlated. The broadest measure is VOICE, which includes the score 
produced by La Porta et al (1998) and aspects of minority shareholder rights. The scores can be 
seen as measures of governments’ attempts to encourage stock market development by 
providing legal protection of shareholders aginst management and dominant shareholder abuse.  
The top scorers are Bulgaria (10.75). Lithuania (9.75), Estonia (9.5), Albania (7.5), Latvia 
(7.25), and Hungary (6.75). Poland follows with a score of 6.25. As for creditor rights, the 
existence of formal law does not necessarily translate ino effective law. 
There is clearly not a strong relation between the number of formal legal measures to protect 
shareholder rights and stock-market development. Parts of the explanation can be a weak legal 
system (Albania), and weak enforcement (Lithuania). Another explanation is that large private 
corporations may not exist in large numbers in the relatively poor countries (Albania, Bulgaria, 
and Lithuania among those mentioned above). More surprising is that Slovenia, the Czech 
Republic and Croatia among the countries with relatively high market capitalization of stock 
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markets, score relatively low on shareholder rights. Clearly, protecting shareholder rights in law 
is neither sufficient nor necessary for development of trading in stock markets at the level of 
development we are concerned with here. 
With this picture of financial sector development and the legal and regulatory infrastructure, 
we turn in the next section.to a discussion of political and cultural factors possibly explaining 
the great differences in pace and level of development of the financial sectors. 
 
6. Explaining Reform Progress and Failure 
 
     Can the great differences in level and pace of financial sector development, which were  
observed in the previous section, be explained? Is it possible to draw policy conclusions for the 
benefit of policy-makers, whose job is to speed up the reform of the financial system?  Without 
being controversial, is it safe to say that sustainable economic development requires that banking 
systems must be made to provide liquidity and credit to the private sector on a commercial basis 
and, once credit is provided, to enforce credit contracts?  Different  approaches to reform of the 
banking system were discussed in Section 4 but even if a set of reforms have been identified, these 
reforms have to be viewed within the political and institutional environment of the country. This 
environment may or may not the receptive to the reforms.  
      The progress of financial sector development has been associated with specific reforms such as 
privatization, recapitalization, absence of strong government guarantees of bail-outs, and the 
implementation of effective bankruptcy laws. If there is general agreement that most of these 
reforms are prerequisites for effective financial intermediation, why have some countries succeeded 
in their reform efforts while others have not?  To answer this question, it is necessary to analyze 
political decision-making and its determinants. 
        The role and influence of various political interest groups are emphasized in economic 
analyses of political decision-making.  In the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the communist 
system, various interest groups had not yet organised themselves in the new political environment. 
Therefore, a “window of opportunity” to initiate a reform path existed. This issue was discussed in 
the introduction to this part of the volume. 
        There were great differences in how this “window of opportunity” was used, and it is of 
interest to explain these differences, as well as the progress of reform once the new political 
systems were established. 
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           It is obvious that the cultural and political legacies from the communist period, as well as 
pre-communism, must have influenced the reform process, both during the window of opportunity 
and after its closing. It is very doubtful, however, that all differences in the transition process can be 
explained by history and culture. Differences in development have certainly been accidental and 
unpredictable to some degree, and the result of actions by particular policy-makers. It must also be 
taken into account that there was great uncertainty about the appropriate approach to reform of the 
financial sector.  Thus, for each country, an element of good or bad luck should be considered. 
         Broad historical, political and cultural factors that could be considered when comparing 
countries’ progress in the transition are the following: 
 
1) Collapse of communism was followed by war in some countries. 
2) Scope of  private property rights and functioning markets during communism differed across 
countries. 
3) Duration of communist rule was not the same in all countries under consideration. 
4) Pre-communist heritage of market institutions and political democracy differed across the  
countries. 
5) Level of economic development achieved by the time of  the collapse of communism differed. 
 
      These factors will not be discussed in depth here but the purpose is to discover what factors, if 
any, successful reform countries have in common. 
        Tables 3-5 contain measures of financial sector and institutional development. It was argued 
that a high level of financial sector development is associated with a high level of financial 
intermediation as measured by the BCPS (Bank Credit to the Private Sector)-ratio, while progress is 
measured by the change in this ratio. What factors explain the level of financial intermediation, and 
relatively rapid or slow progress of the financial sector’s ability to provide financing for the private 
sector?  
           Both questions were addressed to some extent in the previous sections in conjunction with 
the discussion of approaches to reform and the characteristics of the legal systems.  Here we draw 
together the different factors affecting level and pace of change of financial sector activity relative 
to the private sector. 
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          The BCPS-ratios in 1998 are used as proxies for the level of financial sector development 
after the early years of transition. This year was chosen, because it was the year after the turning 
point (from a declining to an increasing BCPS ratio) for many countries in Table 3.  
        To classify the countries into groups based on their level, as well as their progress, of financial 
sector development Table 6 is created. In this table the countries are grouped buy High (>.30), 
Medium (.15 - .30), and Low (<.15) BCPS-ratios in 1998, and by Fast (>25%), Medium (5 - 20 %), 
Slow (-10 - +5 %), and Sinking (< -10%) rates of change of this ratio from 1998 through 2001. The 
input data comes from Table 3.  
 
 
 
Table 6. Grouping of countries based on BCPS ratios in levels (1998) and percent change 
(1998-2001) 
 
 
 
  
Growth 
of BCPS 
Lev-
el 
<.15 
(Low) 
BCPS-ratio 
.15 - .30 
(Medium) 
> .30 (High)
> 25% (Fast)  Estonia  
Slovenia  
Croatia 
5-20% 
(Medium) 
 Hungary  
Poland  
Latvia  
Bulgaria  
Bosnia-H. 
 
-10 - +5% 
(Slow) 
FYR Mac. 
Lithuania  
Romania  
Serbia-M.  
Albania 
  
< -10% 
(Sinking) 
 Czech Rep.   
Slovakia 
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 Although there is no obvious relation between the BCPS levels and their changes, there emerges a 
pattern when the groups are created. Most of the countries can be placed in the diagonal groups 
High-Fast, Medium-Medium, and Low-Slow. The only outliers are the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia. This countries can be classified High-Sinking. Their BCPS-ratio-levels are high but the 
ratios have been declining fast. 
     At a glance, the countries within each group seem to be very different in terms of history and 
politics. If this observation is correct the progress of reforms may have to be explained largely by 
events and decisions within the transition period rather than by historical and cultural factors. 
        Before discussing differences within the groups we ask whether legal system indicators in 
Table 5 above vary systematically across the groups in Table 6? The discussion in the previous 
section indicates that we should expect a pattern. Without repeating the data, it can be seen that the 
High-Fast and the Medium-Medium countries generally have higher scores for “Rule of Law” and 
“Enforcement” than the Low-Slow countries. The two groups are not clearly different in these 
respects. “Creditor rights” are also relatively strong in these two groups. The main exception from 
this pattern is Bosnia-Herzegovina, scoring very low (2.9) on “Rule of Law” (Lacking data for 
enforcement).  Bulgaria  also scores below the other countries in these groups. In the High-Sinking 
group, the Czech Republic scores high on “Rule of Law” but quite low on “Enforcement” and 
“Creditor rights”. Slovakia scores in the middle on all legal indicators. Clearly, these outliers are not 
explained by the legal system. 
         Looking in more depth at the individual countries within each group, the High-Fast group 
includes Estonia, Slovenia and Croatia. No common heritage or similarity of political environments 
explain the relatively rapid progress of these three countries. Slovenia and Croatia were relatively 
wealthy parts of Yugoslavia, wherein a somewhat market-oriented form of communism was 
practiced. Estonia on the other hand was a part of the Soviet Union where communist repression 
was strong. Slovenia has been very slow in privatizing banks, while Estonia privatized and 
restructured the banking system rapidly. Croatia achieved a large part of its restructuring and 
privitization after 1998 (see Table 3) after being set back by the Balkan war. Foreign banks have 
taken over the major banks in Croatia and Estonia, while owner ship in Slovenia is still in state 
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hands to a substantial degree. Thus, it seems that privatization is not a necessary requirements for 
banks to function on a commercial basis.  
       The Medium-Medium Group includes Hungary, Poland, Latvia, Bulgaria, and Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Two of the leaders of the reform of financial systems, Poland and Hungary, are found 
along with a former Soviet Republic, Latvia, a late starter, Bulgaria, and war-torn Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Poland and Hungary are among the relatively well off countries wherein market 
economic principles had made some headway under communist rule. Both countries initiated 
reform of the financial system early although they followed different paths as discussed in Section 
4. By 1997 the banking systems were by all accounts fuctioning according to market economy 
principles in both countries. Latvia and Bulgaria had repressive communist systems and they were 
not among the relatively well-off countries. Their pre-communist backgrounds are very different. 
Latvia reformed and privatized its banking system before 1997, while Bulgaria was a slow starter. 
The fundamental problems identified in Section 3 were not delt with before 1997. Bosnia-
Herzegovina belongs to the very poorest countries in the group. It has been torn by war on its land. 
Nevertheless, privatization has been rapid after 1999 and the share of non-performing loans has 
come down substantially (Table 3). 
   The Low-Slow group consists of Lithuania, Romania, two former Yugoslavian republics--FYR 
Macedonia and Serbia-Montenegro--and Albania. It is not surprising to find the last three countries 
in this group. Albania was and still is among the poorest countries in Europe, while the two former 
Yugoslavian Republics have been preoccupied with war and ethnic conflicts. Lithuania, however, 
would seem to have had the same early conditions for reform as Estonia and Latvia, but the reform 
efforts stalled in Lithuania. The political environment did not allow the necessary reforms to be 
pushed through in spite of rapid democratization as in the other Baltic states. Romania had one of 
the most repressive and corrupt communist governments. Both political and economic reforms have 
been slow and governments willing to take make far-reaching economic reform efforts have been 
unable to survive long. It is nevertheless hard to point to historical factors that explain why 
Romania and Lithuania would not be able to make as much progress as their neighbors. Instead the 
slow pace of reforms in these countries must be explained by the failure of reform minded political 
groups to remain in power in the specific political environments of the countries.  
    Finally we turn to the High-Sinking group consisting of the two countries coming out of the 
former CSFR. This country was on the leading edge of reforms in the early nineties before the split 
occurred and the Czech Republic and Slovakia were formed. The former country continued its rapid 
 31
pace of reforms including radical privatization programs as mentioned above. The relatively high 
BCPS ratio in 1998 is explained by this early progress of reforms. Slovakia on its own turned 
towards a rejection of rapid reform. What the two countries have in common except their origin in 
the CSFR, is that they did not restructure the banking systems along the lines discussed in Section 
4, and kept supporting the SOEs of the communist era, although for different reasons. In Slovakia 
rapid privatization and the cut-off of support to SOEs were rejected, while the Czech Republic 
embarked on radical and rapid privatization. The banks were not privatized at the time, however, 
although they were expected to be managed as commercial enterprises. The voucher privatization 
programs led to funds being set up to buy up vouchers and, therefore, equity in the firms. The still 
state-owned banks set up such funds, and as a result much of the privatized equity returned to the 
state. If the banks could have functioned independently of the political pressures on the state to 
support the former SOEs (as in Slovenia), the state ownership odf banks would have been 
irrelevant. However, the banks did not have this independence. As a result, the support of the 
corporations continued and non-performing loans were accumulated. The share of non-performing 
loans reached crisis proportions in 1999 (Table 3) and credits to the private sector shrank. Both the 
Czech and the Slovak Republics have embarked on bank privatization programs since 1999 and 
foreign banks have obtained control over large parts of the banking systems. The stage is therefore 
set for the development of functioning banking systems that can contribute to private sector 
expansion. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks  
Without summarizing the different sections of the paper a few conclusions can be drawn about the 
factors that have led to successful reform of the financial system in some countries and lack of 
development in others.  
(1) The successful countries are heterogeneous in terms of history, culture and initial conditions for 
the reform process. This heterogeneity indicates that successful reform should be explained by 
the particular reforms that have taken place during the transition years and by the political 
environments that developed in the aftermath of the collapse of communism. Time specific 
country-idiosyncatic factors seem to have played a greater role than historical legacy. For 
example, Estonia’s success may have a lot to do with openness to Finnish radio and TV during 
the communist days, and a language related to Finnish, while the neighboring Baltic states had 
no such Western media access.  
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(2) It is never too late to change. Bulgaria’s reform process was sluggish through most of the 90s 
but the country seems to be catching up in terms of financial development. 
(3) Privatization is not an absolute requirement for successful banking reform, if the banks can be 
made to function on commercial grounds without political interference under state ownership. 
Slovenia demonstrates this. However, there is a question of long term sustainability of the 
independence of political interference if the banks are not privatized. The development of non-
performing loans in Slovenia after 2000 could be an indication of problems to come. 
(4) The one factor that seems to be required for effective financial intermediation is a reasonably 
well functioning legal system. With one exception--Bosnia-Herzegovina--all countries that were 
classified as at least modestly successful in terms of financial sector development have above 
average scores (among transition countries) for Rule of Law and Enforcement of law. 
(5) Foreign control of the banking system can be controversial but seems to have enabled banking 
system in many countries to adopt effective credit evaluation, enforcement, and payment 
procedures more rapidly through knowledge transfer. Other advantages of foreign ownership is 
that the banks’ power as a political interest group may be relatively weak, and their 
independence of political interference relatively strong.. 
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1    Milgrom and Roberts (1992) includes a clear textbook analysis of the problems described below. 
2  The adverse selection problem is often known as the lemon problem. 
3 See, for example, Grossman and Hart (1986). 
4   The reason is that a bank that has lent to loss-making firms and has a zero net worth has nothing to loose and can 
only gain by keeping the firms afloat with new loans. 
5 See Hinds (1995) and Aghion, Blanchard and Carlin (1994). 
6  (1994), Mullineux, Pruski and Klacek (1995), Levine and Scott (1992), Roland (1994), and Blanchard (1994). 
7 The Czech and the Polish cases are discussed in, for example, Begg and Portes (1993),  Aghion, Blanchard and Carlin. 
8 A lender of last ressort provides liquidity to a solvent bank in a liquidity crisis. Central banks often misuse this policy 
instrument to provide liquidity to insolvent banks as well. 
9 See Goldstein and Gultekin (1998) 
10  The data for creditor rights are taken from Pistor, et al (2000). This paper provides details about the various legal 
provisions protecting creditors rights in different ways. 
11  These proxies for shareholder rights are also taken from Pistor et al. (2000) 
